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Abstract
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This paper summarizes the evidence on the evolution of 
transport PPPs over the last 15 years or so. In the process, 
it provides a primer on the associated policy issues, 
including of the central role of project finance in the 
implementation of PPP policies and the debates on risk 
This paper—Sustainable Development Vice-Presidency—part of a wider effort to increase awareness among policymakers 
and researchers of emerging issues in the design of public-private partnerships (PPP) in infrastructure. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at ejuan@
worldbank.org. 
allocation in the design of PPPs. The paper also offers 
a discussion of the increasingly well recognized residual 
roles for the public sector in transport, with an emphasis 
on the regulatory debates surrounding the adoption of 
PPPs. 
 


















st century has started with significant ideological changes involving an 
increasing popular rejection of a strong role for the private sector in the management and 
financing of public services. This change is most obvious in developing countries but is not 
a minor phenomenon elsewhere, most obviously in Continental Europe and to some extent 
in the UK. Despite these changes, despite the high profile contract renegotiations in Latin 
America or Africa,  despite the railways crisis in England and despite the recurring debate 
on the matter within the EU, public private partnerships (PPP) continue to be on the agenda 
of many politicians in both developed and developing countries.
1  
For many governments, the main motivation is the need to reduce the fiscal costs of 
the transport sector.  The concern to cut unit costs is often also present but less obviously 
so.  It has usually been more present in Anglo-Saxon countries but increasingly so in other 
countries as well as indicated by the EU experience. The conviction that private operators 
are likely to be able to deliver services more efficiently is indeed often also a key driver of 
the continued effort to get into PPPs.  
Whatever the driving force behind PPPs, they are expected to deliver infrastructure 
or services at reasonable cost and with attention to social aspects. They also increasingly 
involve the government making explicit comparisons with public funded and managed 
alternatives. Even when public sector borrowing costs will be lower, other factors are 
considered. These include the opportunity cost of public funds and foreign exchange, the 
efficiency and expertise the private sector might bring to the project and the availability of 
international liquidity to support specific project types which lend themselves well to some 
type of securitization. 
 
                                                           
1 To our knowledge, there is no single definition of PPP. It covers a wide range of transactions where the 
private sector is assigned some responsibility, including investment. It ranges from management contracts 
with no investment obligations to concessions contracts with significant investment obligations in addition to 
operational and management obligations. In general, these contracts allow the private operators to collect 
money directy from the users. There are increasingly also many examples in which the government commits 
ex ante to cover the costs of  financing the operations or investment.. The PFI initiative in the UK includes 
many examples of such contracts.  Contract renegotiations often have the same outcome since governments 
end up subsidizing the operations which were supposed to be self financed when the contracts were signed.  
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To some extent, this continued enthusiasm may be counterintuitive in view of 
recurring international financial and liquidity crisis over the last 10-15 years. These crises 
should have reduced the interest in project finance to finance new toll roads, new airports, 
new ports, or new railways in emerging markets. Although after the financial crises in East 
Asia, Russia, Mexico, Brazil or Argentina during the 1990s, project financing almost 
systematically slowed down but it has also systematically recovered. This is because new 
sources of money continue to appear. From pension assets to emerging bond markets to 
new types of bank debt, liquidity is not lacking. Private capital flows to emerging markets 
reached a new peak in 2006, US$ 623 billion
2. Even if credit to some actors may be tighter, 
the global financial markets continue to be liquid and investors are still looking for 
predictable sources of revenue which most transport infrastructures are potentially capable 
of providing.  Spreads may increase to hedge against increased credit risk and as a result 
increased de-leveraging but the market will not disappear. Transport infrastructure where 
the end-user is represented by corporate or commercial clients tends to be less risky given 
their higher payment capacity of tariffs and charges (i.e., airports, ports, cargo railways, 
etc.). Conversely, transport infrastructure where the end-user is represented by consumers 
tends to have more affordability issues and therefore higher risks (i.e., urban transport, toll 
roads, etc.). 
  To some extent, this continued enthusiasm may be counterintuitive in view of 
recurring international financial and liquidity crisis over the last 10-15 years. These crises 
should have reduced the interest in project finance to finance new airports, new ports, new 
railways or new ports in emerging markets. Although after the financial crises in East Asia, 
Russia, Mexico, Brazil or Argentina during the 1990s, project financing almost 
systematically slowed down but it has also systematically recovered. This is because new 
sources of money continue to appear. From pension assets to emerging bond markets to 
new types of bank debt, liquidity is not lacking. Even if credit to some actors may be 
tighter, the global financial markets continue to be liquid and investors are still looking for 
predictable sources of revenue which most transport infrastructures are potentially capable 
of providing.  Spreads may increase to hedge against increase credit risk and as a result 
increased de-leveraging but the market will not disappear. 
                                                           
2 World Bank: Global Financial Markets 
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Although the trend has favored the continued growth of PPP and is likely to 
continue doing so, some things changed in the way the public sector is associating with the 
private sector. Every crisis teaches the dealmakers something new about how to improve 
risk management. Every crisis also reveals an impressive creativity by these dealmakers 
who learn from the mistakes of the past.  In the process, the nature of the deals evolves, so 
do their size and the level and types of leveraging. New types of financial instruments and 
contractual arrangements to ease PPP in transport continue to be developed.  
Some things however don’t change. First, forecasts of revenues, traffic, and 
economic activity continue to be overoptimistic, so that “best case” scenarios often 
continue to be “sold” as “base case” scenarios, helping to justify the investment decisions.
3 
Second, the lack of attention to project evaluation continues to support a willingness to use 
ever-larger amounts of debt in project capital structures. Even high-risk projects faced 
heavy debt servicing burdens. Long-term projects continue to be undertaken which use 
short-term debt, buoyed by confidence that when the debt matured, it will simply be “rolled 
over” on equivalent (or better) terms. Floating-rate debts are still common, further 
increasing interest rate risk. Projects that generated local currency revenues continue to be 
financed in international markets, even if lenders and borrowers know that exchange rates 
are decreasingly predictable in emerging markets. Third, governments continue to get into 
deals with risk allocations they don’t recognize simply because they ignore the potential 
consequences of renegotiation. This may explain some of the highest renegotiation rates are 
observed in the transport sector.
4 
This paper summarizes the evidence on the evolution of transport PPPs and in the 
process provides a primer on the associated policy issues. To do so, section 2 offers a brief 
overview of the evolution of the role of the private sector in transport infrastructure. 
Section 3 discusses the central role of project finance in the implementation of PPP 
policies. Section 4 covers the main debate on risk allocation in the design of PPPs. Section 
5 addresses the main residual roles for the public sector in transport, with an emphasis on 
the regulatory debates surrounding the adoption of PPPs. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                           
3 See Trujillo, Estache and Quinet (2002) or Flybjerg (???) for detailed discussion of the strategic motivations 
explaining recurring optimisms in traffic forecast. 
4 See Guasch (2002) 
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2. The Rise of Private Participation in Transport 
The rise of PPPs in transport has its roots in broader worldwide privatization 
initiatives during the 1990s. While the catalyzer may have been the dramatic changes 
introduced by the Thatcher administration in the UK, the bulk of the transactions actually 
took place in developing countries. Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the dramatic increase in 
the involvement of the private sector in the development and funding of public facilities 
and services across infrastructure activities during the 1990s. It shows that transport 
benefited from a relatively small share of the private commitments to the sector (about 15% 
of the US$1000 billion or so committed between 1990 and 2005 to all infrastructure 
sectors). It is also a relatively small share of the investment needs of the sector since the 
commitments made for this 15 years period represent very roughly the investment needed 
in 1 year in transport in the developing world. 
 
 





Figure 1 Investment commitments in infrastructure projects with private 















Source: The World Bank and PPIAF, PPI Project database.
Transport
While the amounts do not represent a huge share of the investment needs of the 
sector, they are very significant. On average, these deals represent about US$10 billion 
annually in the developing world alone and about twice as much when developed countries 
are considered. This is about 55 projects a year across transport sub-sectors in developing 
countries alone. There is no strictly comparable data for developed countries but most 
estimates turn around 20 large projects a year on average over the last 20 years, with a 
growing number of projects in the last 5 years or so.  
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The distribution of projects across sectors and regions is also of interest. About two-
thirds of the projects are in roads, about 18% in rail, 12% in airport and less than 7% in 
ports.  The average project size also varies significantly across sectors ranging from about 
US$ 105 million in ports to about US$307 million in rail. The average project in roads and 
airports is roughly US$180 million. 
At the regional level, Europe captures about a third of the projects, Asia/Oceania 
and North America capture about a quarter each and Latin America about a fifth. Africa 
and the Middle East do not seem to attract many transport PPPs. Within developing 
countries, about half of the projects of the last 15 years of so were signed in Latin America 
and about a quarter in East Asia. The largest projects tend to be in East Asia with an 
average project size of about US$250million, followed by Latin America with projects of 
about US$ 190 million on average. In the other regions the average projects are less than 
US$ 80 million on average.    
There are many forms of private participation in transport, including: 
•  Greenfield projects such as Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) projects, where the 
private sector has the primary responsibility for financing, developing, and 
operating the facility for a fixed period of time, which should be sufficient to both 
repay debt and provide the required return on investment. At the end of the 
concession, assets are transferred to the government under terms agreed to in the 
contract. Perhaps the most familiar form of participation in transport infrastructure, 
this has been employed in many different variations.
5 There are alternative versions 
of these contracts such as Build, Own, and Operate (BOO), where the private sector 
obtains the ownership and control of the facilities, with no transfer to the public 
sector. 
•  Concessions, where the private sector receives the mandate to operate and expand 
an existing network and in the process is asked to take on most of the commercial 
risks associated with the business. Often these contracts are done as joint ventures, 
in which the public and private sectors share responsibility for financing and 
                                                           
5 These include Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT), Build-Transfer-Operate 
(BTO), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), and Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF). 
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operation of public facilities; often also, these contracts include a greenfield project 
subcontract which covers the additional investment obligations to be delivered 
under the concession contract 
•  The contracting out of services, where the private sector is contracted to provide 
services on behalf of the government for compensation, either in terms of a share of 
revenue, profit, or payments form the government. In general, contracting out does 
not involve financing risk, although it may involve revenue risk. 
Concession contracts, followed by greenfield projects tended to dominate the large scale 
PPPs over the last 15 years or so. They represented over 70% of all contracts signed in 
developing countries in the sector. Divestitures are much less common than in energy or in 
telecoms for instance but they do take place in all sectors, in particular airports, a sector for 
which management contracts are also relatively more common than in the other transport 
subsectors.  
 
3. The Central Role of Project Finance in Transport PPPs 
While it is quite common to grant private operators the responsibility for the 
delivery of services in specific cities, region or at the country level, the investment 
components of these responsibilities are often subject to specific contractual forms. These 
specific forms of the contracts supporting the investments are driven by the ability to pull 
together financing schemes around the specific investment project. Project finance is indeed 
typically used in those sectors that require large capital expenditures, that have long-lived 
assets, and that require long periods to amortize investment costs and generate required 
rates of return for both creditors and equity holders.  
Project finance is generally used to describe financings in which the lenders look to 
the cash flows of an investment project for repayment, without recourse to either equity 
sponsors or the public sector to make up any shortfall. The sponsor usually tries to structure 
the project so that the gross assets and liabilities of the project are kept off the sponsor's 
balance sheet.  
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In the end, the deals are financed from a wide range of very different potential 
sources, each with different positions, stakes, and incentives that influence the project 
outcomes. Some of these sources may only be available at different stages in the life cycle 
of the project. These sources include equity, mezzanine finance, commercial lending, bond 
finance, project leasing, development finance institutions, export credits, finance, or 
guarantees provided by bilateral export credit agencies and derivative products, including 
securitization.
6 
This is roughly how it works in practice. In general, the private operator is granted a 
concession by the government to design, build, and/or operate transport services or 
infrastructure for a specified period. This concessionaire typically is responsible for raising 
the finances required to carry out the project. At the end of the concession period, the 
facilities and their operation may be transferred to the host government, depending on the 
nature of the contract. The concessionaire will typically form a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV), in which a project or a set of projects is treated as a separate entity from the 
sponsors. Funds are then borrowed solely based on the project’s or project package’s cash 
flows and the equity in the SPV itself.
7 This independence allows the project package to be 
                                                           
6 Equity is generally the lowest ranking form of capital because the claims of the equity investors will rank 
behind all creditors. On the positive side, the equity holders gain disproportionately if the project performs 
better than expected Different forms of investment other than straight equity might be considered as “pseudo-
equity”. For example, in the UK, project sponsors will commonly consider lending debt to the SPV that is 
subordinated to all other borrowings. This might be considered as an alternative to additional equity, and is 
normally based on tax considerations and standing in bankruptcy should the concession fail. Mezzanine 
finance falls somewhere between senior debt and equity. Examples include subordinated debt and preference 
shares. Payments are made to these investors only after senior debt is serviced and will only be made if certain 
conditions are satisfied, such as minimum coverage ratios or investment requirements related to the 
performance of the project. The risks taken by mezzanine providers are greater than those of senior creditors, 
and so required returns will be higher (but lower than those required by traditional equity investors). 
Mezzanine capital might be provided by certain investment trusts, mutual funds, or insurance companies.. 
7 As the SPV is usually only a legal construct, it needs to ensure that it performs its obligations under the 
concession agreement by sub-contracting those obligations to third parties. The principal parties usually are 
the construction contractor and the operator of project facilities. It is common for one or both of these parties 
to be part of the sponsor consortium, or an affiliate of the sponsors. Since there are usually multiple sponsors, 
the relationship between them is clearly defined and usually set out in a shareholders’ agreement. The SPV 
might have other equity investors, such as development finance institutions or the government. The SPV is 
capitalized by the sponsors in agreed proportions, normally on the terms set out in an agreement that deals not 
only with the sponsors' initial capital investments but also with any further obligations with respect to future 
contribution obligations. In addition, rules are established with respect to how the SPV is to be administered, 
how it is to be financed, how sponsors share profits, and how, if at all, sponsors may transfer or sell their 
shareholdings or interests in the SPV. 
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separated from the equity investors’ balance sheet; therefore it is frequently referred to as 
“off-balance sheet financing”.
8 
The financing structure has a number of recurring characteristics. For instance, bank 
debt is the primary debt funding source and sponsor equity is committed, and sometimes 
paid up-front, prior to the provision of any debt finance. In general, the cash flows of the 
project's package is the principal basis for returns for both debt and equity investors, and 
the project's assets are the principal collateral for any borrowings. It is important to note 
that payments to equity holders are subordinate to operating costs and debt service 
obligations. Once the project is operational, lenders have no or very limited recourse to the 
credit of the project's owners (either sponsor equity or government in the case of BOT 
projects). Overall, the transaction heavily relies on contractual commitments between the 
project participants which is why the regulatory and supervision capacity of governments is 
so crucial to the success of these transactions.  
The difficulties encountered in emerging markets in the 1990s and the well-
publicized problems experienced by some transport infrastructure projects have forced both 
the private and public sectors to expand the idea of project financing. While the ultimate 
goal may be to arrange project borrowings which will provide a minimally expected rate of 
return to sponsor equity and at the same time be completely not demanding for the sponsor 
or the government, such a goal has proven almost impossible to accomplish, except in a 
few extraordinary situations. 
The advantages of project finance vary across participants in the transactions. 
Promoters of project finance (sponsors and investment bankers) prefer project finance 
because it has allowed them to undertake projects without exhausting their ability to borrow 
for traditional projects, and without increasing debt ratios (or at least those that are 
calculated based on reported financial statements). Project finance structures can be used by 
                                                           
8 Note that the commercial banks who generally lend directly to the SPV tend to have a very significant 
control over the SPV. On the one hand they are expected to finance the project on a non-recourse or a limited 
recourse basis, emphasizing project revenues as the primary source of repayment of interest and principal. It is 
in return for agreeing to finance the project on such a basis that the banks are likely to require the ability to 
exercise a considerable degree of control over the SPV and its activities, and to have “step-in rights” should 
any one of a large number of triggering default events occur.  
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companies to limit their financial risk to a project to the amount of their equity investment.
9 
In addition, if the project itself has particularly strong and secure cash flows, project 
finance may allow more debt to be employed in the financing mix, since creditors do not 
have to worry about project cash flows being siphoned off for other corporate uses.  
Project finance may provide stronger incentives for careful project evaluation and 
risk assessment. Since the project's cash flows are keys to obtaining financing, such 
projects should undergo careful technical and economic review and sensitivity analysis. 
This may lead to clarification of the nature and magnitude of project risks and what causes 
them. Having a detailed, objective assessment of project risks and potential may not only 
enable risks to be allocated to the appropriate parties, but in some cases, the project analysis 
itself may reveal ways to change the project to reduce the overall level of risks or to 
improve their allocation. For example, demand analysis of a toll road may show 
opportunities to delay expansion until certain traffic levels trigger new investments in 
capacity. 
But project finance also has some disadvantages. They are more complex than 
traditional corporate or public financing, typically involving many more parties and 
resulting in significantly higher transaction costs. The complexity of project finance deals 
also makes them very expensive. The due diligence process conducted by lenders, legal 
counsel, and other technical experts results in higher development costs, with higher fees 
and interest margins than what is typically charged. It is not unusual for the total cost of a 
project finance transaction to cost twice as much as straight debt or equity finance. Total 
costs may reach 7 to 10 percent of total project value. When acting as a financial advisor to 
a project, investment banks will typically charge high monthly fees, plus all expenses. They 
also typically receive a success fee if the project reaches financial closure, which can range 
from .0025 to 1.0 percent of total project value.  
Negotiations on various aspects of the project are usually protracted and may be 
quite contentious. This is especially true for transport projects, which typically are 
politically sensitive, have high visibility, and retain strong public interest and participation. 
                                                           
9 The non-recourse nature of the debt in a project financing may change during the life of the project. For 
example, debt may be structured to provide recourse to the project sponsor only during the construction and 
commissioning phases. 
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Getting parties with diverse interests to agree on the nature and magnitude of risks is very 
hard, let alone getting them to agree on who should bear these risks. The documentation 
associated with project financing is almost always complex and lengthy. 
Even after the financing is closed, the project will usually be subject to closer 
monitoring by all parties. Because lenders primarily rely on revenue flows to repay their 
loans, the degree of lender supervision of the management and operation of the project will 
most likely be greater than for an ordinary corporate loan. Likewise, public officials need 
an ongoing program to monitor contract compliance and potential exposure to any 
guarantees that have been provided, as well as regulatory oversight when deemed 
necessary. Projects finance makes this monitoring particularly complex. In the initial 
stages, sponsors are likely to fund their equity contribution either internally or from on-
balance sheet borrowings. Governments need to be careful to monitor the sources of this 
initial investment. In some cases, while the project equity appeared sound, the additional 
borrowing by the sponsor’s parent company so weakened the overall company that 
bankruptcy of the parent impaired the ability to undertake the specific project obligations. 
In sum, monitoring risk is not only an issue at the beginning of a PPP, it is a issue 
throughout the duration of the contract.  
 
4. Risk at the Center of Transport PPPs 
The identification and management of risks is at the core of the design of any PPP. 
This is particularly obvious in the context of the project finance dimensions of the PPP 
because of the non-recourse or limited recourse nature of project debt and the limited 
contractual undertakings of the project owner. Since each project faces a different set of 
risks, it is always best to try to identify them at the outset and allocate them to the 
appropriate parties. This is why one of the first tasks that public officials should address is 
to understand the distribution of risks to which each party is committed. In many 
renegotiations or regulatory disputes, the ultimate responsibility and resolution will be 
based on the assignments spelled out in the contract. 
The experience of the last 10-15 years suggests that risks are actually very real!  
Various studies have shown the extent to which things often don’t happen the way they 
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were planned. According to Guasch (2002), about 75% of the transport contracts in Latin 
America were renegotiated. Flyvbjerg and his various co-authors have managed to 
document that the problem is just as important in developed economies. They show that 
risks should be a concern at all stages of the process.  
For new projects, they start at the construction phase where the major risks are 
delays in completion and the commencement of project cash flows; cost overruns with an 
increase in the capital needed to complete construction; and the insolvency or lack of 
experience of contractors or key suppliers.  Construction costs may exceed estimates for 
many reasons, including inaccurate engineering and design, escalation in material and labor 
costs, and delays in project start-up. Cost overruns typically are handled through a fixed-
price and fixed-term contract, with incentives for completion and for meeting pre-specified 
investment goals. Other alternatives include provision for additional equity infusions by the 
sponsor or standby agreements for additional debt financing. It is always sensible for 
developers to establish an escrow or contingency fund to cover such overruns. Delays in 
project completion can result in an increase in total costs through higher capitalized interest 
charges. It also may affect the scheduled flow of project revenues necessary for debt 
service costs and operating and maintenance expenses. 
In developing countries, in addition, there is also the risk of unavailability of 
equipment or materials for construction or operation must be considered. This is especially 
true with respect to rolling stock or in for specialized equipment, like gantry cranes or 
loading bridges used in ports or airports. Transit bottlenecks, tariffs, foreign currency 
fluctuations and other factors can cause a significant increase in costs. Moreover, there are 
also the risks that the main contractors and key subcontractors lack the experience, 
reputation, financial, technical, and human resources to be capable of completing the 
project in timely fashion on budget. This risk is best addressed through tough pre-
qualification of bidders (if sponsors are also contractors); through certification and 
monitoring if unrelated parties are used; and by ongoing financial oversight of the 
contracting companies themselves, to make sure that poor results form other projects or 
from weak balance sheets do not spill over into the specific project of interest. 
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Transport projects can also have a substantial environmental impact. Such projects 
frequently attract strong opposition from community and environmental groups over issues 
of pollution, congestion, neglect of public transport and visual impact. Similarly, land 
acquisition can be a protracted process with the potential for extensive legal delays, 
particularly in developing countries.
10 In general, the public sector often ends up taking on 
the responsibility for most of these risks since often it is easier for the public sector to take 
the responsibility for acquiring the rights-of-way, to pay for them and contribute this asset 
to the project. Project sponsors often try to ensure that the government bears the risk of 
providing all necessary land within a given time frame or being liable for damages. 
Furthermore, the cost of land acquisition can become a major factor where land values have 
risen rapidly or are subject to speculative activity over which the project developer has no 
control. In these cases, agreement on some form of cost ceiling may be necessary in the 
concession contract. In some cases, a special government body may be charged with 
implementing the land acquisition process. Generally, the host government should ensure 
that required licenses and permits be obtainable without unreasonable delay or expense. 
But risks are also very present at the operating phase. The major risks for transport 
projects in these stages relate to technology, traffic/revenue risk; regulatory and legal 
changes; interest rate and foreign exchange risks; force majeure risk; and political risk. 
PPP designers cannot ignore new technologies since they can either significantly 
improve the profitability of a project or adversely affect any project that uses obsolete 
technology. For example, the use of automatic toll collection technology reduces collection 
costs and incentives for graft. Another example is technological improvements in customs 
processing, so that border crossings on major arterial toll roads can be traversed more 
quickly, saving time for users and making the road more valuable. 
Unlike project financing in other sectors, take-or-pay or fixed-price contracts are 
typically not available in transport, so that demand risk is a major issue in virtually all 
projects. Even when there is a reasonable level of confidence in forecasts, demand can be 
dramatically affected by competition form other modes or facilities, changing usage 
patterns, and macroeconomic conditions. These interrelated issues, over which the project 
                                                           
10 For example, land assembly was a major factor in delays in the construction of the Bangkok elevated 
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sponsor often has little or no control, are very difficult to predict and represent a major risk 
to financing. In particular, forecasting during the early years can be quite subjective. To the 
extent that these risks are driven by economic conditions, there is a potential role for the 
government to play in risk-sharing, either through traffic or revenue guarantees or other 
forms of support. (These are discussed in more detail below.) 
But demand uncertainty must be viewed realistically. Over-optimism in traffic 
projections is common for privatization teams focusing on convincing private operators of 
the value of their business and for potential operators who want to get the deal, convinced 
that they can renegotiate almost anything once they have taken over the business.
11 To see 
this, take the case of toll roads. Traffic volumes are very sensitive to income and economic 
growth and the failure to recognize this may be one of the main reasons why so many toll 
road projects have failed or ended in bitter renegotiations. Motorization and vehicle-
kilometers traveled tend to increase faster than income levels. This high income elasticity, 
especially for leisure trips, makes toll roads especially sensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions. For roads that serve export activities, exchange rate changes can dramatically 
affect trade, leading to major changes in demand patterns. Many toll road projects in the 
last decade have dramatically overestimated traffic levels. In some of the Mexican road 
concessions, traffic volumes were only one-fifth forecast levels. In Hungary, the M1 
Motorway attracted only 50 percent of expected volume in its first year of operation. The 
Dulles Greenway, outside of Washington, initially only attracted one-third of its expected 
daily volume. Even after a toll reduction of forty percent, the Greenway still was only able 
to achieve two-thirds of its originally forecast volume. Note that some of these demand risk 
can be hedged against through contracts with flexible duration as proposed by Engel, Fisher 
and Galetovic. 
12 
Financial risk is the risk that cash flows might be insufficient to cover debt service 
and then to pay an adequate return on sponsor equity. Financing constraints, especially the 
lack of long-term debt capital, are a significant hindrance to toll road development. Since 
the advent of financial crises in emerging markets, few projects are able to generate returns 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
highway. 
11 See Trujillo, Quinet and Estache (2002)  for a longer discussion of the strategic behavior in transport bids.  
12 Engel, Fisher and Galetovic (2001) 
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on investment sufficient to attract private capital. This suggests that until macroeconomic 
risk premiums decline and traffic growth is more established, only a limited set of projects 
will be undertaken without substantial government support. The financial crises will force 
many programs to slow down and force debt restructuring of many of the existing 
concessions. There is a need to promote more secure financing structures to reduce the risk 
of potential bailouts. 
In theory, financial risk is best borne by the private sector, but in transport projects 
there is likely to be substantial government risk sharing either through revenue or debt 
guarantees, or participation by state or multilateral development institutions. There also 
may be cash grants or other financial contributions that serve to improve the project rate of 
return on private finance. Passenger transport tariffs tend to be very politically sensitive and 
governments are often more willing to grant subsidies to finance costs than to aim at full 
cost recovery as they more often do with freight transport.
13 
The recurring financial crises of the last 15 years have shown that currency risks 
need to be taken seriously. The main currency risk is driven by the impact on the value of 
the business of fluctuations in the exchange rate. In addition, the toll concession can be 
subject to a convertibility risk which refers to the possibility that the operator may not be 
allowed to exchange local for foreign currency. These are major issues for some projects, 
where revenues are commonly in local currency and adjustments for inflation and exchange 
rates may lag or encounter political opposition. Projects can reduce this risk by tapping 
domestic capital markets where possible. Most projects attempt to mitigate exchange risk 
by provisions for indexing to inflation, although in practice the magnitude of exchange 
volatility has made such requirements difficult to enforce. 
  There is also increasing evidence that PPP designers need to anticipate more 
carefully force majeure issues. This refers to risks beyond the control of either the public or 
private partner, such as floods or earthquakes, which impair the project's ability to earn 
revenues. While some private insurance is becoming available for catastrophic risks, the 
public sector generally is faced with the need to restructure the project should such disasters 
occur. This may take the form of extending the concession term, or to provide additional 
                                                           
13 In many countries, often developed, infrastructure subsidies are also quite common for ports and rail. 
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financial support. The rule is that remedies in the event of force majeure risks should be 
stated in the contracts; for example cash compensation or an extension of the concession 
term equal to the length of the disturbance. 
In addition to these business related risks, there are risks associated with the 
interactions with the public sector. The main risks in this category are regulatory, legal and 
political risks. Regulatory risk stems from the weak implementation of regulatory 
commitments built into concession contracts but also in laws or other legal instruments 
relevant to the value of the transaction. The question asked is whether the regulator will 
exercise its authority and responsibilities over prices, public obligations, competition rules 
and similar rules that are specified in the contracts and that influence the value of the 
business. The solution is to try to make sure that regulators have rules to follow and that 
they are independent enough to be able to enforce them.  
But even if regulatory rules are clear enough, they are only as effective as the 
regulators can be. The best designed regulatory environment is useless if the regulator is 
not independent or fair. This risk is more common than it appears and pressures on 
regulators are a major source of concern which investors reflect in their required rate of 
return. In 1999, a major factor in the restructuring of Mexico’s toll road program was the 
pressure on regulators to cut tolls. In Thailand, a similar concern resulted in decision by the 
government to cut by 50 percent a toll level it had committed to in a BOT contract.  Similar 
examples could be provided for a large number of countries in more recent years. The 
outcome is generally that the government ended up taking over the facility. 
PPPs typically cover periods of ten years or more. The relevant legal and regulatory 
environment is likely to change substantially over that period. The rules dealing with the 
financial consequences of these changes between government, users and operators are 
critical and yet often forgotten. The rules must cover the possibility of adaptation of the 
contract terms during the tenor of the project financing.  
Political risk concerns government actions that affect the ability to generate 
earnings. These could include actions terminating the concession; imposition of taxes or 
regulations that severely reduce the value to investors; restrictions on the ability to collect 
or raise tariffs as specified in the concession agreement; precluding contract disputes to be 
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resolved in reasonable ways. Governments generally agree to compensate investors for 
political risks, although in practice justifications for government actions may be cited to 
delay or prevent such payments. Thus, private investors generally assume the risks 
associated with dispute resolution and the ability to obtain compensation should the 
government violate the concession agreement. The issue of meeting financial obligations 
while disputes are resolved may be achieved through a requirement of debt service 
reserves, escrow, or standby financing.
14  
The credibility of the government to uphold contractual obligations and the 
willingness and ability to provide compensation for political risks are key issues for project 
finance. Issue of delays or denials of tariff increases have made many prospective parties 
wary of entering into new projects. This is especially true for foreign capital, which is 
perceived as especially vulnerable to political risks. Some of the more risky emerging 
markets may require support from multilateral or bilateral financial institutions to reduce 
this risk exposure. In addition, political risk insurance may also help manage issues of 
inconvertibility, transfer, and confiscation. 
The project finance component of PPPs involves many participants, each with 
important roles to play. They include the government, the constructors, the 
operators/concessionaires, the lending commercial banks and the very heterogeneous 
groups of other lenders which include national and regional development banks, bilateral 
agencies, export credit agencies, and development finance institutions.  
The allocation of risks among all these actors is thus clearly an essential dimension 
of the design of PPPs. One of the long-standing tenets of project finance has been that the 
project participant who controls or is best able to manage the risks should bear them. While 
true in principle, reality often fails to live up to the goal. Risk allocation is complex and 
difficult, and for all practical purposes it is a negotiated process. For example, governments 
are responsible for changes in the law, yet the risk and consequences of such changes are 
often shifted to the private sector. Or, the central bank may have the greatest responsibility 
for inflation and interest rate outcomes, yet in reality it is often the project developers, 
                                                           
14 These political risks are starting to be documented quite well empirically. For instance, Athias and Saussier 
(2007) find that contracts signed with left leaning public authorities, rather than with right leaning public 
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creditors, and equity providers who end up bearing the interest rate risk. There are 
numerous other risks that do not necessarily end up being borne by the party best able to 
manage it. More often, it is the best and most experienced negotiator that ends up bearing 
the least amount of risk. 
Also, the level and type of risk encountered may change over time. The 1998 Asian 
crisis increased perceived risk levels enough to increase the required rate of return to levels 
unachievable for most projects. On the other hand, governments may fall prey to a “fear-
greed cycle”, in which governments become afraid of program failure and thus offer 
increasingly better terms. Alternatively, prospective concessionaires who worry that they 
will get left out bid unrealistically. Subsequently, the element of greed takes over in which 
governments may fail to live up to commitments and the private sector seeks ways to 
privatize gains and socialize the project’s risks.  
Successful PPPs have been characterized by a broad level of risk-sharing between 
the public and private sectors. Generally, the private sector is better at managing 
commercial risks and responsibilities such as those associated with construction, operation, 
and financing. In contrast, transport projects most likely depend on public participation in 
areas such as acquisition of right-of-way, political risk, and in some cases, traffic and 
revenue risk. PPPs has worked best when experienced, well-capitalized firms have enough 
discretion over design and confidence in pricing policy to accept construction and some 
degree of traffic risk, while the government assumes the risks that it controls and gives 
consideration to financial support or guarantees if traffic levels in the early years are 
insufficient. 
Ultimatelly, the market seems to be adjusting in the kind of contracts it is writing. 
Athias and Saussier (2007) highlight the fact that the contracting parties try to sign not only 
complete rigid contracts in order to avoid renegotiations but also flexible contracts in order 
to adapt contractual framework to unanticipated contingencies and to create incentives for 
cooperative behavior. In the case of toll roads, this gives rise to multiple toll adjustment 
provisions and to a tradeoff between rigid and flexible contracts at the design stage. In an 
econometric assessment of 71 contracts, they find that the standard view that a rigid 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
authorities, appear to be more likely rigid. This seems to corroborate the conjecture that private 
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contract is to be preferred as soon as specific assets are high, may be true only if other 
conditions concerning poor adaptation of costs, renegotiation costs and the probability to 
see the contract enforced are met.   
 
5. The Role of the Public Sector in PPPs 
Besides the contractual partnership with the private operator, there are two main 
ways in which the government continues to be involved in the activities covered by the 
PPP. The first is the provision of ex-ante guarantees and ex-post guarantees which consist 
of financial contributions to offset the consequences of undesirable unexpected event which 
have resulted in a renegotiation of the contract. The second is the regulation of the sector, 
which generally includes the monitoring of commitments made by all parties through the 
contract.     
5.1 Guarantees 
Governments may have to provide guarantees for a wide range of reasons as 
suggested in the recent book by Irwin (2006). When unexpected events arise and a 
renegotiation of a contract arises, government need to come up with a mix of government 
actions that ensures that an acceptable financial return can be generated. This means that 
the rate of return of the PPP has to cover its cost of capital.
15 These actions may include 
some redesign of the financing schemes to include guarantees but also of the project design, 
including its duration as suggested by Engel et al (2001).  
A variety of mechanisms can be used to support private financing ex ante by 
facilitating the closure of the financing aspects of the PPP. These range from revenue 
enhancements to equity guarantees. Equity guarantees gives the private operator the option 
to be bought out by the government at a price that guarantees a minimum return on equity. 
Although the liability is contingent, the government in effect assumes project risk and 
corresponding private sector incentives are reduced. A debt guarantee is an equivalent 
instrument to protect the lenders. It ensures that the government will pay any shortfall 
related to principal and interest payments. The government may also guarantee any 
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refinancing that is scheduled. It creates significant government exposure and reduces 
private sector incentives, although it may decrease the cost or increase the amount of debt 
available to the project. Governments can also provide subordinated loans which can fill a 
gap in the financing structure between senior debt and equity. From the government's 
perspective, they also have the attractive feature that they can be repaid with a return if the 
PPP is successful. There are also a number of interventions which reduce the risks 
associated with demand. A minimum traffic or revenue guarantee, in which the government 
compensates the concessionaire if traffic or revenue falls below a minimum threshold, is a 
relatively common form of support for toll roads and more rarely so in railways, airport or 
ports. 
16 This guarantee can often help facilitate the access of the operator to the financial 
market. 
17  The main alternative to this guarantee to protect against demand risk is to allow 
the contract to have a variable duration. The contract ends when the demand has reached 
the level built in the bidding documents. Ex-post, this can also be achieved through contract 
extensions. These types of financial support involve limited public sector risk, but also do 
little to support or enhance private financing. First, a government can extend the concession 
term if revenues fall below a certain amount. Second, a government can restrict competition 
or allow the development of ancillary services by the concessionaire. 
For developing countries, the main risk may be the exchange rate risk. With an 
exchange rate guarantee, the government agrees to compensate the concessionaire for 
increases in financing costs due to exchange rate effects on foreign financing. Exchange 
rate guarantees expose the government to significant risk, as well as increasing the 
incentive to utilize foreign capital. This can be an important challenge of highly leveraged 
transactions in foreign currency.  
In addition to these instruments which are typically discussed an assessed and 
negotiated before the contracts are signed, there is a series of instruments government often 
use as part of the renegotiation of contracts. These include grants or subsidies which ideally 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 See Alexander et al (2001) for a discussion of the cost of capital in the transport sector.  
16  Note that in some countries such as Chile for instance, minimum income guarantee to protect the operator are 
introduced jointly with revenue sharing scheme which allow the government to share—30-50 percent— into extra profits 
(i.e. revenue generating a return in excess of 15 percent) when traffic is consistently above forecast. 
17 If government's share "downside risk" with the private sector through guarantees, they should also consider 
seeking instruments that allow profit on the “upside”. One way to do this is by a revenue-sharing arrangement 
in which the government receives a portion of revenues above a maximum traffic threshold. 
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should be identified ex-ante but which are more common as part of contract restructuring, 
at least in the transport sector.  In Argentina, this subsidy took the form of a forgiveness of 
accumulated payments due to the government for the right to operate the concession. In 
general, these grants or subsidies have no provision for repayment. A common approach to 
commit to subsidies ex ante in some OECD countries is the provision of subsidies through 
shadow tolls. Under a shadow toll, the government contributes a specific payment per 
vehicle to the concessionaire. Because they are paid over time, they may be less of a burden 
on the public budget. The drawback of shadow tolls, though, is that they may not provide 
investors with much protection from revenue risks. In addition, the payment of shadow tolls 
over time creates a credit risk for concessionaires. These inefficiencies can be reduced in a 
number of ways, such as a declining payment schedule as volumes increase or a maximum 
traffic level beyond which shadow tolls are not paid. Output-based aid (OBA) is another 
example of subsidy driven PPP. In this case, it is a mechanism for providing explicit 
performance-based subsidies to support the delivery of basic services where policy 
concerns—such as limited affordability for some consumers, a desire to capture positive 
externalities, or the infeasibility of imposing direct user fees—justify public funding to 
complement or replace user fees.  
 
  5.2 Institutional roles of government in PPPs 
  While these financing dimensions of the additional role of government in PPP are 
quite essential, they are relatively simple in relation to regulation and monitoring 
responsibilities, the second main role of the public sector in PPP. Normally the government 
that perceives the need for an infrastructure project and determines whether it is suitable for 
PPPs. In some countries, special units are prepared to package and preparare the PPPs on 
behalf of the government.
18 The specifics, of course, will depend partly on the political and 
economic situation facing the country, as well as the characteristics of the project itself. It 
might be necessary to enact specific legislation, or even to change the constitution, to 
enable the financing to proceed. (Many national constitutions prohibit private ownership or 
control of essential public facilities.) In addition, since PPPs are critically dependent on 
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contractual obligations between many parties to the deal, it might be necessary to enact 
legislation specific to the project or sector. It also may require clarifying laws relating to the 
recognition and enforcement of contractual obligations and security rights, or the laws 
relating to nationalization, expropriation, and arbitration. The regulatory regime within 
which the project is to function should also be clearly defined. 
Maybe the most underestimated institutional dimension around PPP transactions is 
the set up of the institutional capacity to monitor the contract. The standard suggestion is to 
create an independent regulator who will monitor the commitments made by all parties to 
the PPP and is accountable to all these parties, including the users, for the effectiveness 
with which it delivers this regulation function. This academic recommendation has not been 
overwhelmingly endorsed in the transport sector. While independent regulatory institutions 
are quite a common match for PPP arrangements in utilities services such as electricity, 
telecommunications or water services, they are not as common for the transport sector. 
Indeed, few countries have created a transport regulator that monitors all PPP across 
subsectors. Most are in Latin America and even then, in most cases, land transport and 
waterborne transport are generally handled by different agencies.   
In most cases, the PPPs are regulated by a public sector agency specialized in a 
specific sector.  Road Agencies supervise both public and private roads and often have a 
responsibility to monitor transactions associated with secondary roads. Ports, airports or 
railways PPPs are generally controlled by a specialized agency. Ports authorities generally 
enjoy that mandate for ports but are generally assigned a single or a set of ports. They are 
responsible for the management of the PPPs in the port under their mandate.  In countries 
with multiple ports, a national agency often supervises all the local port authorities and in 
some instances may manage the award of the concessions in each port even though their 
monitoring is assigned to the local port authorities. Similar arrangements are observed for 
airports. A single authority is generally responsible for the award of airport concessions but 
in countries with multiple airports, local supervision of compliance with the contractual 
commitments is not uncommon. Rail is simpler. Concessions are generally regional and in 
most country, they cover the whole country. The most common institutional arrangement in 
that case is a single regulator for all rail concessions. In large countries with significant 
passenger and in particular suburban transport as in Argentina or Brazil for instance, the 
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passenger and freight rail services are unbundled and the management and key PPP 
decisions of passenger rail services are often assigned to the cities or municipalities served 
by these suburban operators.  
The main advantage of a national model of regulation of all transport infrastructures 
is it ensures consistency in the handling of sectors across the country. It also allows the 
countries with limited human capital to do the most with the scarce skills available. The 
main disadvantage is the government loses sometimes much needed flexibility to deal with 
sector or regional specificities. There is no clear best practice benchmark. For the road 
sector, after a number of failed attempts, road agencies are starting to deliver in terms of 
maintenance as well as in terms of investment choice and implementation. The Port sector 
is starting to realize it needs to look for a new model as the nature of the business is 
changing. 
19 The main challenge for the airport sector has been the difficulties encountered 
in addressing jointly military and civilian needs in airports. It is still adjusting to the fast 
growing traffic and it is likely that this sector will have to rethink its model as well once the 
market will have settled. Overall, an unbundled model also creates some problems in terms 
of the coordination of the subsector’s policies. One of the reasons why some many 
countries have a hard time supporting effectively the development of effective multi-
modalism is the atomization of the policy design and regulation of transport activities in the 
assignment of government responsibilities.  The main solution to this coordination problem 
is to rely on a competition agency to address any concern of inconsistent regulatory 
decisions. This option is however limited to many countries who do not have a competition 
agency or the necessary skills in those agencies.  
 
6. Concluding Comments 
Recurrent developments in emerging financial markets and the recent credit crisis 
catalyzed by the US mortgage crisis have so far not dramatically changed the appetite for 
transport infrastructure projects.  Transport infrastructure projects that have significant 
commercial risk will face ever higher interest rates, with debt premia for political, currency, 
regulatory, and sectoral risks. They will also face lower equity contributions with some 
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actors unwilling to put more than 5-10% of equity in the PPP, in particular in developing 
countries.
20  The substitution of construction equity for portfolio equity will not suffice. 
Depending on the particular project, rates of LIBOR plus 6 to 10 percent should not be 
unexpected. In addition, widely used performance indicators such as Debt Service Cover 
Ratios have been adjusted, so that previous standards such as coverage of 1.5 times interest 
payments now are commonly 2.0 times or even higher. As a result, there will be increasing 
pressure for governments to make become involved as equity holders in these projects or 
government will be increasingly asked to provide guarantees.  
PPP efforts in transport, in particular in developing countries, are shifting from new 
projects to the privatization, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing facilities. The 
established track records of many facilities lower perceived risks and also the associated 
revenue stream from the outset to cover capacity additions have become key elements in 
transport PPPs.. Efforts to bundle transport projects into PPP “packages” for both revenue 
diversification and to obtain cash flows from a portfolio to fund specific investments within 
the package of facilities have also increased over time as obvious ways of minimizing or 
spreading the risks. 
Transport PPPs seem to be in the hands of an increasingly concentrated number of 
actors, including operators, sponsors, bankers, and investors. In transport, just as in other 
public utilities, about fifteen to twenty project players have emerged at the aggregate level 
and even less within each subsector. This group is characterized by large size and large 
capacity to invest; (relatively) low cost of capital with deep access to financial markets; 
sophisticated development skills; and strong financial support from their parent companies. 
It is also an increasingly multinational club with a global presence in competitive and non-
competitive transactions. While local investors and others may participate in specific 
niches, these major organizations have become quite effective at setting the acceptable 
standards and de facto practices in transport project finance.  
As the key actors are increasingly well known and as transport policy and 
regulatory institutions start to be able to deliver on their mandates, PPPs will become more 
effective policy tools in developing countries. The road to success has been—and still is-- 
                                                           
20 See Correia et al (2006) 
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long, simply because governments and their policy advisers have somehow been slow to 
learn from mistakes. There are enough success stories to be confident about the future of 
PPPs as an instrument of transport policy. The hopes should however be limited to those 
activities for which PPP can help (ports, airports and high traffic roads for investment. For 
some countries with high commercial, institutional or political risks, PPPs are not going to 
be the optimal option for many of their transport needs. For all the others, ignoring them 
would be just as bad a policy decision. 
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